This paper provides evidence on the responsiveness of local governments to the preferences of their voters under incentives introduced by the Affordable Care Act (ACA). Local governments participate in the health care system as both a patient care provider and third-party payer (See Figure 2) . In doing so, local governments represent the majority of the public health service economy. In recent years, local governments have outspent state governments about $3-to-$2 on hospitals and were about even on public health service expenditures on aggregate terms. Using data from the Census of Governments from 2006 to 2015, we employ a difference-indifference framework to study the effect of the state decision to expand Medicaid on their local governments' fiscal indicators. We find that local governments in areas that voted for Obama responded to their state's Medicaid expansion by increasing expenditures on hospitals, wheras those that went for Romney reduced theirs and used the savings to reduce property taxes. We demonstrate further that this finding is not driven by an urban/rural distinction. We then extend this analysis to determine (1) the extent to which observed changes in local government financing are affected by changes in hospital revenue; and (2) assess the effect of these changes in local government funding on the finances of surrounding hospitals. We rule out the possibility that changes in local government spending are a response to hospital competition and find evidence that hospitals in Medicaid expansion states observed increased profits, following the expansion.
Introduction
One of the main rationales for the existence of local governments is that they can be responsive to differing consumer-voter preferences for public provision of goods and services. However, there is often skepticism towards decentralization on the grounds that voters may not be particularly good at monitoring or controlling local government actors if the voters possess incomplete or asymmetric information. A variety of policy packages in which states are expected to constrain local governments, such as Tax-And-Expenditure Limits or Dillon Rules, presumably exist on the underlying view that local voters are systematically lacking in their capacity to constrain the actions of their local governments for their own benefit. Another concern is that local governments will not be capable of delivering welfare or poverty assistance programs because they are competitive for mobile actors who will only support taxes for services from which they directly benefit, and hence higher levels of governments receive the prima facie case for the provision of social insurance programs. These competing concerns on the trustworthiness of local governments to support an efficient and equitable society are important determinants of an everlasting debate over the appropriate degree and scope of governmental decentralization.
This paper provides evidence on the responsiveness of local governments to the preferences of their voters under incentives introduced by the Affordable Care Act (ACA). Local governments participate in the health care system as both a patient care provider and third-party payer. In doing so, local governments represent the majority of the public health service economy. In recent years, local governments have outspent state governments about $3-to-$2 on hospitals (see Figure 1 ) and were about even on public health service expenditures on aggregate terms.
1 In fact, hospitals represent a significant consumer of government inputs with one-third of local government employees working in hospitals.
2 Despite this almost no attention has been given to the public economics of health care delivery. The ACA represents a quasi-experimental opportunity for investigating local government intervention into the health sector.
3
In 2012, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled the Medicaid expansion provision of the ACA to be voluntary for the individual states. The subsequent state-level decision to expand Medicaid under the ACA represents an arguably exogenous shock at the local government level. This expansion reduces the share of uninsured patients within local markets and the federal government covers its cost in the initial years of the expansion. From an economic perspective, the ACA resembles a matching categorical aid grant to local governments by offering reimbursements for previously uncompensated hospital care services. 4 A median voter whose preferences include delivering services to poor community residents might encourage an expansion of these services as they become subsidized through Medicaid expansion. On the other hand, if their is demand is already satiated near current levels, then the reduction of necessary tax support to cover previous services can be translated into spending on other public goods or tax cuts. How such contrasting effects might net out is therefore an empirical question that this paper addresses by assessing the effect of state Medicaid expansion on relevant local government fiscal variables as a means to nationally study the elasticity of local government support for hospitals.
The main strategy of this paper is to identify key fiscal variables that shed insight into the changing patterns of local governments' delivery of hospital services. This is pursued via a differences-in-differences design to investigate the effect of state Medicaid expansion under the ACA on local government fiscal outcomes from 2006-2015. Since the amount of the subsidy varies by the share of uninsured population in the area, we include specifications that allow for this responsiveness to be heterogeneous by exposure to the uninsured. We then split the sample according to whether the encompassing county voted for Barack Obama or Mitt Romney in 2012 as a proxy for local voter preferences for public intervention into the delivery of health care systems. We provide evidence that local governments in Obama supporting areas increased their engagement with hospital services, whereas those in Romney leaning areas reduced their contributions and subsequently lowered taxes. We then complement this analysis with a dataset of hospital financial records to demonstrate consistent evidence and rule out alternative explanations related to changes in market conditions.
The literature this paper most directly contributes is that on decentralization and government responsiveness. In recent decades, fiscal federalism and the appropriate degree of devolution has been particularly motivated by the widespread governmental structure reforms throughout Latin America, many parts of Asia and Africa, in the regions of the former Soviet Union, as well as the rise of the European Union. In the context of this debate, proponents of decentralization and devolution argue that local governments will become more responsive by customizing spending decisions to local needs, preferences, and values (Wallis and Oates, 1988) . The critical literature, particularly where equity based services are paramount, have articulated the case for centralization on the basis of expertise and capability at higher levels of government as well as a greater robustness to corruption and organized interests that might be experienced among relatively resource poor local governments (Crook and Sverrisson, 1999) .
While the decentralization literature is massive, most of the literature investigates various observable differences in economic indicators as decentralization occurs. Does decentralization result in more economic growth (Oates, 1993; Zhang and fu Zou, 1998) ? Does decentralization result in changes in the total amount of government spending (Fiva, 2006) ? Do more decentralized governance forms result in improved public services (de Janvry et al., 2012; Galasso and Ravallion, 2005) ? What substantially fewer studies do is demonstrate whether such differences are a consequence of adhering to local voter preferences. Investigations of responsiveness to voters has tended to be case studies of decentralization, particularly in countries where structural shifts have occurred in recent years from which generalizations are quite difficult (Robinson, 2007; von Braun and Grote, 2000) .
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An exception to this is found in Faguet (2004) , which is the most similar research project to this paper. Faguet studied the case of major structural decentralization in Bolivia, where a 1994 national reform introduced substantial decentralization. Using a unique database of objective indicators that were based on local "needs" that could be related to measures of public investment. The study finds public investment in these areas of need increased with decentralization, consistent with the view that local governments were better at targeting public investment than the central government. While there is perhaps some argument that decentralization is a story of responding to the voters own subjectively determined priorities rather than objective needs, it nevertheless provides a compelling set of evidence that local governments are institutionally capable of matching preferences.
An important novelty of this paper is the institutional setting in which we study local government responsiveness. Instead of examining a case featuring the realigning of functions and purposes of government, we instead look at an arguably more representative instance where the surrounding environmental conditions change. That is, we study a moment where one should expect local governments to respond to the changing environment in a manner consistent with local voter preferences. Such a setting might carry greater external validity than the previous case studies, since shifting vertical assignment functions within federalist systems are a less common occurrence than the many presumed environmental changes the citizen expects its government to respond to in representing their interests.
This paper also contributes to the related literatures on the financing of hospitals and charity care. Medicaid expansion significantly reduced charity care burdens (Dranove 5 For an extensive overview of these see the special issue of World Development introduced by Faguet (2014) . et al., 2016) , which suggests hospitals in expansion improved financially. However, previous policies similarly intended to alleviate charity care costs find that publicly-supported hospitals may be worse off due to cream-skimming behaviors from competitors (Duggan, 2002) . Therefore, the second contribution of this paper is to provide an empirical assessment as to how publicly-supported hospitals have been affected by the ACA, both to complement the main analysis and rule out this phenomenon as an alternative explanation. This analysis is highly policy relevant due to the anticipated $44 billion cut in federal support for charity cut scheduled to take effect by 2025.
The next section will review background and relevant literature on local government financing of healthcare, the ACA, and government compensation for charity care. Section 3 provides a conceptual framework for thinking about how the ACA should influence the local government behavior in ways that are relevant to the observed data. The data, empirical model, and pre-trend analysis is provided in sections 4.1 and 4. The results are presented in section 5 and section 6 concludes.
Background

The Affordable Care Act
Medicaid is a federal and state partnership with shared authority and financing. The central purpose of Medicaid is to provide health insurance to low-income individuals. Traditionally, the program has concentrated on low-income children, pregnant women, the elderly and people with disabilities. All states must meet federal minimum requirements, but they have options for expanding Medicaid beyond the minimum federal guidelines. States, at their discretion, have extended coverage to parents of children in low-income homes and to childless low-income adults.
The ACA presented an option to standardized Medicaid eligibility across all states to all low-income adults. The objective of the Medicaid expansion provision under the ACA is to fill in coverage gaps among low-income households by creating a minimum Medicaid income eligibility level across the country, as of January 1, 2014. To encourage adoption of the threshold, the federal government offered to reimburse state governments for costs associated with the eligibility expansion. The rate of this compensation was scheduled to decrease at regular intervals to a minimum federal reimbursement rate of 90% by 2020.
The anticipated effect of Medicaid expansion was expected to vary based on pre-ACA Medicaid eligibility guidelines. For states without prior adult Medicaid coverage, like New Mexico, this provision was predicted to increased enrollment by 30 percent. For other states, like Connecticut, the anticipated effect was small because the pre-ACA income eligibility requirements of the state equaled or exceeded the ACA's threshold of 133% of the federal poverty line.
The actual effect of Medicaid expansion has also varied because 19 states have elected not to adopt the ACA's expansion provision. For the purposes of this study, the 19 states that have not expanded Medicaid represent "control" states; the remaining 31 states and D.C. that have expanded Medicaid represent "treatment" states. Within the treated category, we also separate states by whether Medicaid expansion represented a mild expansion, such as in Connecticut, or a full expansion, such as in New Mexico.
Projections of the ACA's net impact on state finances is positive (Bachrach et al., 2015; Dorn et al., 2015) . State-specific reports indicate encouraging results from the ACA (Antonisse et al., 2016) . Several states reported savings in non-health budget items, like criminal justice (Smith et al., 2015) . Sommers and Gruber (2017) find that the nationally higher spending associated with Medicaid expansion was funded from federal contributions (12.2 percent increase) and no significant increases in spending from state funds are observed. Despite the relatively small net change in state spending, there has been considerable heterogeneity across states; while states allocated an additional $846 million in 2017 to their Medicaid programs, 19 states implemented mid-year budget cuts (NASBO, 2017) .
State and local governments stand to benefit from the ACA via several channels. First, among states that previously provided limited benefits to low-income adults became eligible for full Medicaid coverage, which would reduce the state's pre-ACA share of the cost from 50% to 0% under the enhanced federal funding rate (increasing to 10% in 2020) and enrollees would gain full Medicaid benefits. Specifically, states expect savings from covering pregnant women and adults who have spent down their assets due to high medical need. Second, in addition to partially funding Medicaid, states have historically supported mental and behavioral health programs and public health programs with state general fund dollars. Post-Medicaid expansion, beneficiaries of these programs and services gain insurance, which means that these services could be reimbursed with federal dollars, rather than state and local funds.
While studies of the ACA's effects have focused on state and federal governments, local governments play a significant financial role in securing healthcare access. Changes in local government health spending from the ACA have the potential to affect population health. Freudenberg et al. (2006) find that reductions in municipal government support of hospitals worsened rates of tuberculosis, human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) infection, and homicide, increasing spending five times over the initial savings of the fiscal cut. However, in the absence of an acute financial need or change in population health, the more plausible driver of local government decision-making is the preference of the median voter.
In this study, we treat Medicaid expansion as an exogenous shock, which is a method that has been used previously. Using the Census of State and Local Governments, the same data as this study, Baicker (2005) use federal mandates related to Medicaid eligibility expansions to low-income pregnant women and children as exogenous shocks on statelevel spending from 1983 to 1992. In this study, we use state-level decisions to expand coverage as an exogenous shock on the local government.
The ACA differs from these previous forms of fiscal shock in several key ways. First, Medicaid expansion is largely funded by the federal government, representing a positive shock to local and state government finances. Responses to these shocks are not necessarily symmetrical to negative shocks previously observed in the literature. Second, the shock is not limited to the public sector; private hospitals were also expected and intended to benefit because Medicaid coverage does not impose a restricted provider network. Thus, Medicaid expansion increases the patients ability to afford care from providers that were in accessible when the patients were uninsured. The effects of this increasing substitutability between public and private hospitals has not been directly addressed as a matter of policy or studied in the literature.
The ACA explicitly offered fiscal relief to state governments through a number of mechanisms 6 , but no similar provisions were provided to local governments. Further, hospitals that rely on transfers from local government may be more financially vulnerable than private hospitals.
Government Compensation for Charity Care
In anticipation of lower rates of uninsurance, the ACA also included provisions to reduce federal financial support to hospitals providing uncompensated care to the uninsured ("charity care"). These cuts were intended to maintain budget neutrality and applied to all hospitals, regardless of their state's Medicaid expansion decision. Hospitals with a 24-hour emergency department (ED) are unique from other health care providers because the Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act (EMTALA) requires them to treat anyone who comes to the ED, regardless of the patient's insurance status or ability to pay. EMTALA is not directly funded, which means that hospital costs to treat uninsured who cannot pay are a form of "bad debt". Further, hospitals face potential financial losses from the treatment of Medicaid patients: the differences between treatment costs of Medicaid payments and Medicaid reimbursement rates are known as "Medicaid shortfalls". The term "charity care" is the sum of bad debt from uninsured patient care and Medicaid shortfalls.
Hospital charity care is indirectly compensated when hospitals provide a higher share of uncompensated care, relative to others in their state. Such hospitals are designated as Disproportionate Share Hospitals (DSH) and, as a result, receive payments from the Centers for Medicaid and Medicare Services (CMS) to cover the costs of providing care to uninsured patients. DSH payments are paid by CMS to states and are capped at 12% of what states spend on their respective Medicaid programs. State governments, in turn, distribute the payments to hospitals. These allotment decisions made by the state do not necessarily mean that they must target DSH payments to hospitals with high levels of uncompensated care. The allotments are at the discretion of each state government.
Since the ACA is expected to reduce uncompensated care costs, the ACA included a scheduled reductions of Disproportionate Share Hospital (DSH) payments, from 2014 through 2020. The start of these decreases have been delayed each year as hospitals claim the DSH reductions far outweigh the reductions in charity care. Further, although not all states have expanded Medicaid, DSH payments are expected to be cut in all states.
In a study of hospital finances in California, Neuhausen et al. (2014) find that decreases in uncompensated care costs due to the ACA insurance expansion may be outpaced by the number of patients who remain uninsured, low Medicaid reimbursement, and medical cost inflation. They estimates that unmet DSH costs will increase $156 million by 2019, relative to 2010 levels. In a more recent descriptive survey, Hayford et al. (2016) find that one-quarter of the hospitals reported negative profit margins following Medicaid expansion, but not enough to discontinue operating.
The financial vulnerability of hospitals that receive local government funding have also been studied by Meyer (1999) . In a survey about the role of local governments in 3 cities, they find the sites differ in terms of financial solvency, none were completely financially secure or solvent. Duggan (2002) exploits a 1990 change to California's Medicaid program that increased DSH payments. He finds that higher reimbursement for publicly-insured patients resulted in a higher share of publicly-insured patients in private hospitals. Duggan also finds that local governments reduced funding to local hospitals at an equal rate to the hospitals' gains under the changed DSH policy. However, due to cream-skimming behaviors across hospitals, local hospitals were arguably worse off because private hospitals treated the least severe, most-profitable Medicaid patients. This conclusion implies that decentralized management of safety-net hospitals reduces waste when re-allocating funds from a centralized source. However, less is understood about how well local governments can predict changes in hospital financial dependence on transfers following changes in the patient insurance mix.
Previous work has focused on hospital responses to changes in federal compensation for the provision of charity care to uninsured/medically need populations. Hansmann et al. (2003) find that private hospitals, whether for-profit or non-profit, reduce the provision of unprofitable services more quickly than public hospitals, following cuts in federal reimbursement for such services.
Conceptual Framework for Inferencing
It has already been established that local governments are substantive actors to the health care system through their support of local hospitals (see Figure 1a) . Voters of local government derive some utility from both the provision of some set of low-income hospital services (h) as well as private and other non-hospital public services (z). The cost per unit of providing services h is P per unit, but the median voter's optimization problem is based on some fraction of P that is defined as s. We assume some agreement between the government representative serving as the voter's agent and those of the hospital establish some h * as their provision level. Taxes on the voter must therefore must cover the local government's share of the expenditures on delivery, and likewise observed expenditures by the government will be sP h * .
If the local government resides within a state that opted to expand Medicaid to all low-income adults under the ACA, then care providers of the newly covered patients can now bill Medicaid and seek reimbursement, including health providers with whom they had negotiated sP h * in the pre-expansion period. This represents an effective price reduction to the hospital to providing service h. If we define γ ∈ (0, 1) to be the share of P remaining after Medicaid reimbursement, then the local government agent negotiates with the delivery of services on the effective price of sγP for each unit of h. Observing a change in spending on h with the ACA is, by itself, not indicative as to whether local government agents are representing their constituent interests. If spending on hospital services increases, for example, then it could be that hospitals or local organized medical interest groups are able to leverage the opportunity into additional subsidies by lobbying local governments. While the framework demonstrates that state Medicaid expansion will have ambiguous effects on local government expenditures on health services, it also implies the observed change in h should be more positive for a local government representing a voter with a high preference (i.e., high income or price elasticity) than low, ceteris paribus, which offers a potential testable prediction.
Of course, voter preferences for h are not directly observed, but they are arguably signaled through voting data. Elections, particularly the 2012 presidential election, present a signal to the researcher about voter preferences that local government officials already know. This information asymmetry arises because, while there are no national surveys of county-level political priorities, elected local officials are more likely to reflect their constituency. Nationally, Americans did not list healthcare and public insurance as a top-five concern in the 2008 election, but, in the 2012 election, survey respondents ranked this topic second in importance only to the state of the economy. The candidates themselves had distinct brands of health care reform: "Obamacare" and "Romneycare", which while actuarially similar in value, were characterized as being pro-government-intervention and pro-market-based intervention respectively. Therefore, the ACA offers a quasi-experimental design opportunity as states make initial decisions about whether or not to expand Medicaid to all low-income adults. Care providers of patients covered by the expansion can now bill Medicaid and seek reimbursement. This decision represents a price reduction in the provision of health care to local governments in Medicaid expansion states, which could be used to increase local government hospital-related spending, increase provision or quality of other non-health services, or be transferred back to the median voter via lower taxes. The key assumption for our inference on the representativeness of local governments is that local governments with constituents whom voted for Obama will have higher income and price elasticities for local public hospital services than those which voted for Romney in 2012.
These differences in spending are observable at the hospital-level as an overall reduction in the likelihood that hospitals received grants or transfers from government. Further, financial indicators related to profitability, patient service, and charity care should also be detectable in ways that correspond consistently with any observed changes in the encompassing governments.
outcomes being observable. Section 4 will provide more details on the empirical model specification and the fiscal outcomes to be monitored in order to draw inferences for the research question.
Empirical Approach Effect of Medicaid Expansion on Local Government Outlays and Revenue
To assess local governments' responses to the ACA and the Medicaid expansion, in particular, we estimate a difference-in-differences-in-differences model using government-year observations. This model leverages three sources of variation: pre/post differences defined as before after the standard start date of the expansion (P ost2013), differences in Medicaid expansion and non-expansion states (Expansion s ), and differences in pre-expansion rates of uninsurance (U nins2013 s ). This last dimension is the potential intensity of treatment, as it captures the degree to which the population at hand was impacted by the expansion of Medicaid. The effect of the ACA in non-expansion states is presented by β 1 as the ACA could have impacted market conditions even in non-expansion states. The effect of the Medicaid expansion in expansion states is presented by β 2 , so the full effect of the ACA in expansion states is β 1 + β 2 . However, the research question of this paper is whether or not local governments responded to the price change incentives created by state Medicaid expansion, so the effect of interest is β 2 . Both terms will be systematically reported for those interested in this full effect, but our identification claims and discussion will be restricted to β 2 .
Spend lst refers to outlays made by local government l in state s at time t. Outcomes of interest are (1) total hospital spending, (2) hospital construction, (3) hospital charges received by the local government, and (4) property tax revenues. Total hospital spending is the fiscal outcome directly motivated by the conceptual model in section 3. Hospital construction is a subset of total spending and might provide insight as to whether local governments changed their propensities to invest in hospital systems as a result of Medicaid expansion. Accompanying the interest in expenditures is what is occurring on the revenue side, to provide a more complete picture of how the local government has responded to the price decrease in providing hospital services. Most American local gov-ernments rely on the property tax because it is a stable source of revenue oweing to the fact that they can declare in the budget process an amount to collect in property tax revenues from their stock of taxable property wealth, as opposed to other revenue instruments where a rate is set and the base fluctuations are forecasted for anticipated revenues (Mikesell and Liu, 2013) . The consequence of this approach is that, at the margin, the last marginal dollar of budget expenditures is implicitly determined by property tax revenues (Ross et al., 2015) .
8 Finally, anticipated reimbursements from Medicaid for hospital care charges are a source of revenue that can be used for government income, particularly in the cases of public hospitals that are dependent on local governments. Even when there is no direct dependence, hospital-government negotiated agreements can take the form of the government backing some services and being reimbursed by some share of hospital charges that are successfully collected. Consequently, Medicaid expansion could cause an increase in revenue to local governments as more charges are paid, or observed revenues from this source could decrease if governments and hospitals no longer undertake such agreements as the hospitals are expected to be able to better finance themselves from Medicaid reimbursements alone. One challenge to our approach is the potential for omitted variable bias. Local governments may differ in their spending patterns due to differences in baseline population or heterogeneity in local economic conditions. We control for this possibility in the vector X lt : median income at the county level; population demographics: age, sex, and race; and hospital market characteristics, such as market concentration by hospital bed size and the number of private hospitals operating within the same hospital-referral-region as the public hospital. Further, given the richness of the data, we include local government unit fixed effects (θ l ) to account for time-invariant differences among units, like council structure or use of a professional city manager. To control for national changes in the demand and supply of hospital services, the specification also includes year fixed effects (θ t ). These year fixed effects control for changes in patient mix from provisions in the ACA that apply to all states, such as the individual health mandate. These two-way fixed effects present a basic difference-in-differences framework to estimate the effect of Medicaid expansion on local government outlays. We also include state-by-year trends to account for differences across states over time (θ st ); these trends account for differences in trajectory related to other aspects of Medicaid program design or population health.
The estimation of equation (1) is not easily interpretable because it requires a selected level of U nins2013 s in order to report magnitude and statistical significance levels. For presenting our main results, U nins2013 s will be replaced with an indicator variable that equals 1 if the local government is in a county that fell into the highest quartile of the national uninsured distribution. This specification is provided in equation (2) and will appear in the main body of the paper, while estimates of equation (1) will be provided in the appendix.
Finally, as described in the conceptual framework, estimates on β 2 the full sample of governments do not necessarily indicate that local governments are doing so at their constiuents' preference. Our main inference will come from splitting the sample based on whether the county voted for Obama or Romney in the 2012 election, so reported will be β k 2 , where k is an indicator for Romney or Obama.
A fundamental assumption of this approach is that trends among treatment groups were parallel in the pre-period. Visual inspection of these outcomes in the difference-indifferences setting (Figure 3 ) indicate that the assumption holds. We formally test this assumption via a event-study regression. Restricting the sample to data from 2006 to 2013, we drop the post-period from the specification and test for pre-trends by interacting with individual years from the pre-treatment period instead of P OST to provide comparable estimates β 1 and β 2 . The results for each fiscal outcome and eventual subsample explored in the paper are provided in the Appendix Tables A1 to A4. Overall the pretrend assumption seems reasonably satisfied. Looking at total hospital expenditures in Appendix Table A1 , the pre-trend year interactions with U nisur2013 × Expansion are not significant in the full, Obama, or Romney sample of counties, with the exception of Obama counties in 2007 where the lowest significance level (p-value of 0.1) is realized. If we divide the sample by urban/rural status, the pre-trends have some significant terms in rural areas, particularly rural-Romney voting areas. Nevertheless, the overall look at the samples for the main results (Obama and Romney) look promising for the pre-trend assumptions, and this pattern is repeated throughout the other dependent variables shared in Appendix Tables A2 through A4. Second, it is possible that using the 2013 uninsured rate over-estimates the return to Medicaid expansion. Since the passage of the ACA, the Medicaid expansion provision was well-publicized as state governments challenged the federal mandate. While there was some uncertainty about which states would expand Medicaid following the 2012 Supreme Court decision, it is possible our results are biased by an Ashenfelter dip whereby individuals dropped private coverage in anticipation of becoming Medicaid-eligible. Such anticipatory actions would bias measurement of treatment effects. To address this possibly, we re-estimate the results using a pooled measure of uninsurance, from 2011 to 2013. These results are consistent in magnitude and direction with the main analysis (Table A12) .
Effect of Local Government Outlays and Revenue on Hospitals
To complement the above analysis of changes in government outlays and receipts, we also provide an analysis of hospital financial conditions using an alternative data source. For instance, an alternative to the hypothesis that local governments respond to median voter preferences is that they are responding to changes in market conditions of local hospitals that perhaps also drive voting patterns. This possibility is especially likely in areas with limited provider access and where a strong component of the community safety-net centers on public funding of local hospitals. We test this possibility by examining outcomes at the hospital-level.
If hospitals in expansion states are these changes in funding affect the financial performance and service provision of hospitals that rely on these local government transfers. This analysis is conducted at the hospital level (i) and includes hospitals that reported receiving state/local funds prior to Medicaid expansion. As in the case above, we can similarly predicted changes in hospital financial measures usint the triple-difference specification:
The hospital financial outcome indicators include operating margins, profit margins, bad debt to receivables ratio (ie. uncompensated care), Medicaid outpatient visits, Medicaid inpatient visits, and whether there are any grants or transfers from governments.
By geocoding addresses to government boundary maps, we can similarly split the sample according to the government types to see if the results are consistent with the government analysis and to rule out competing concerns of market conditions biasing the results.
Data
Measures of local government fiscal indicators are collected from the Census' Annual Survey of State & Local Government Finances. For the purposes of the study, we focus on local general purpose governments that constitute counties, townships, and municipalities that provide general government services.
9 The sample consists of only local governments that had hospital expenditures in the pre-period and were surveyed at least once in the pre-period and once in the post-period. Measures of hospital performance are extracted from the Medical Cost Report data maintained by the Centers for Medicaid and Medicare Services. Annually, hospitals submit these reports to track the care provided to recipients in public insurance programs and the uninsured. These reports also include general measures of hospitals size, ownership type, and financial status: operating and profit margins.
The measure of pre-Medicaid expansion uninsurance rates at the county level are extracted from the Census Bureau's Small Area Health Insurance Estimates data. We include the estimated uninsurance rate among adults 19-64 who report income less than 200% of the federal poverty line in 2013.
We also use the Census Bureau's Small Area Income and Poverty Estimates program produces single-year estimates of income and poverty for all U.S. states and counties as well as estimates of school-age children in poverty for all 13,000+ school districts.
We further limit the sample by excluding states that expanded Medicaid after 2014: Alaska, Indiana, Pennsylvania, Montana and Louisiana.
The data in the hospital-level analysis uses the Medicare Cost Reports to observe changes in hospital finances, the provision of care to publicly-insured patients, and hospital size. The location of each hospital was verified using the Provider of Service files and Google API. The hospital sample is limited to hospitals that operate within Hospital Referral Regions (HRR) with the same zip codes as the local governments from the Census data. HRRs define hospital markets based on utilization patterns of Medicare patients, because these patients are not limited to a specific network of providers, as are privately-insured patients, and all hospitals accept Medicare, which is not necessarily true of Medicaid patients. Each of the 306 HRRs has a minimum population size of 120,000. Additional details have been outlined at the Dartmouth Health Project (Wennberg, 1996) . Among the 2,976 local governments in the sample, 82 percent are located in HRRs with at least one hospital.
Pre-trend Hospital Analysis
Visual inspection of the pre-trends indicate that for all outcomes, with the exception of operating margins, the assumption of parallel trends hold (Figure 4) . The variation between expansion and non-expansion states' operating margins support use of a triple-difference specification. Using the event history approach where a year indicator is interacted with the 2013 uninsured rate and the Medicaid expansion indicator, we find that the assumptions of parallel trends are likely to hold (Table A6 to Table A10 ). If these coefficients are collectively not significant or are significant with in the opposite direction of the main analysis, then it indicates that trends observed after 2013 were attributable to the changes in the ACA. The pre-trend analyses provide support for the validity of the main analysis. Table 3 presents the estimated treatment effect of Medicaid expansion on local government finances for the specifications in equations (2) for local government total expenditures on hospitals and hospital construction, as well as local government revenues from hospital charges and the property tax. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Table  1 provides corresponding summary statistics to reference sizes. The variable of interest is P ost × Qt4U nins2013 × Expansion.
Results
In the first columns of results in Table 3 , provides the estimation of equation (2) before sample splitting. Broadly, the results are not statistically significant and quite small when compared to the dependent variables' respective means and standard deviations. The only slight exception is that hospital construction is significant at the 0.10 level and the point estimate is about ten percent of the pre-period standard deviation of the expansion states. Overall, no clear effects or patterns emerge from the first columns.
The second and third columns of Table 3 split the sample based on whether the encompassing county voted for Obama or Romney in the 2012 elections, the main specifications for inferencing. In nearly every case, signs take opposing directions with many significant effects. For total health expenditures, the Obama-voting governments increased total expenditures on hospitals by about $323.5 million, which is about 31 percent of the standard deviation in the pretreatment period, and is statistically significant at the 0.01 level. Romney areas, by contrast, reduced spending on hospitals by a $49.7 million margin that is statistically significant at the 0.001 level. Interestingly, this seems to have been enough to reverse the trend, as comparable areas in both specifications that did not expand were falling and increasing in Obama and Romney areas, respectively. Both specifications for local government expenditures on hospital construction were negative and statistically insignificant.
On the revenue side, Obama voting local governments reported more revenues from hospital charges in expansion states. The effect size of $61.8 million is statistically significant at the 0.05 level and the effect size is about eight percent of a standard deviation. Property taxes also increased by about $20 million, but the precision on this coefficient is quite poor with a standard error of $128.9 million. In Romney voting areas, property taxes decreased by a statistically significant $8.1 million while revenues from hospital charges declined by about $11.5 million. Together with the expenditure results, these findings suggest that local governments in Obama areas where states expanded Medicaid responded by becoming more engaged in hospital services, obtaining more commitments from reimbursed hospital charges and spending more resources on hospital services. Romney area governments where expansion occurred reduced its involvement with hospital services, reducing their expenditures, becoming less likely to receive revenue shares from hospital charges, and used the reduced public sector activity to cut property taxes. We find the same pattern of results if we employ the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation on the fiscal outcome (see Appendix Table A14 ) or if a continuous measure of uninsurance rates is employed (see Appendix Table A13 ).
A possible counter explanation is that the results in Table 3 are simply picking up an urban/rural divide, as urban areas tend to vote for democratic candidates over republicans. To consider this, we split the sample again for relevant distinctions with the results also reported in Tables 3. Splitting the full sample on simply urban or rural designation does not immediately reproduce the results of Obama-Romney. While statistical significance wanders, hospital expenditures increase in both urban and rural, as do revenues from hospital charges. Property taxes decrease in urban areas while increasing in rural, the opposite of would be expected if Obama and Romney were just proxies for urban and rural.
If we split the Obama and Romney subsamples further each by urban and rural designation, we see that the original Obama versus Romney results remain intact. That is, if urban areas that went for Obama are compared to urban areas that went for Romney, then we see the same pattern merge as in the full sample. Obama urban areas spent more on hospitals, collected more revenues from hospital charges, and property taxes did not significantly change. In Romney urban areas, spending on hospitals and revenue from hospital charges both declined, and it seems this unplugging from hospital services resulted in property tax savings. This also appears in rural Romney areas, where the expansion manifested in reduced property taxes paid for by a decoupling from expenditures on hospitals. Obama rural areas are a very small sample, but it nevertheless follows the same patterns, albeit with mostly effect signs that are statistically insignificant.
Generally, it seems the best explanation is that local governments reacted to state Medicaid expansion in ways that are likely to be consistent with the preferences of their voters. Reducing the cost of servicing sick, low-income residents caused Obama-voting local governments to invest further in hospital service delivery, while Romney counties used the ACA subsidy as a crowd out of local efforts and passed the savings to their voters with lower taxes. We can test to determine the extent to which these changes were driven by variation in patient profitability and the subsequent effect of these changes on hospital finances using data from the Medicare Cost Reports.
Hospital-Level Analysis
Our findings so far suggested that local governments are receiving additional support from Obama area governments in expansion states, while becoming detached from governments in Romney areas. For the Obama results, an alternative explanation is that public hospitals are an inferior good among those who were induced into obtaining private insurance because of the ACA, and subsequently the local governments are aiding these hospitals to maintain services as they lose their more profitable patients.
10 In the Romney results, if this is a pure crowd out effect story, then it should not be the case that such hospitals are overall made worse off, rather they have just substituted funding to obtain similar services at a lower tax cost. Table 4 presents the estimated treatment effect of Medicaid expansion on hospitals located within and close to local governments in the sample for the specifications in equation (3), split again similarly to the government analysis. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Due to the limited number of observations, clustered standard errors are not possible. The outcomes for the hospital-level analysis are hospital operating margins, profit margins, the ratio of bad-debt-to-receivables, as well as the share of care provided to Medicaid patients. Finally, we consider the differences in the likelihood of receiving state/local funds. Unfortunately for the purposes of this paper, the source of government grants measure cannot separately distinguish between state or local funding. Summary statistics of the universe of 2,440 acute-care hospitals are presented in Table 2 . The variable of interest is P ost × U nins2013 × Expansion; we do not use the top quartile of uninsurance indicator due to limited variance.
Exploring the Obama results, the effect of Medicaid expansion does not indicate significant changes in operating or profit margins between expansion and non-expansion states (Table 4 ). This finding indicates that the profitability of patient mix did not shift following Medicaid expansion. If there was cream-skimming among hospitals, the distribution of operating margins would have shifted, and indeed, the statistically insignificant sign is in the wrong direction to be consistent with a cream-skimming story. Similarly, charity care as measured by the bad debt ratio decreased by a statistically insignificant margin, again inconsistent with a cream skimming narrative. In fact, expansion states in Obama areas served fewer Medicaid patients as a percentage of their total activity, consistent with serving a larger population of privately insured individuals, and by statistically significant magnitudes. While state funding is mixed with local funding, Obama areas reported a slight statistically insignificant increase in the likelihood of receiving any money from governments. The picture here appears to be more consistent with our inference of increased governmental support rather than market condition changes induced by the ACA.
For the Romney results, across the board we see very small effect sizes that are not statiscially signifcant, with the exception being a small but statistically significant increase in the percent of Medicaid patients in expansion states. There is nothing to suggest that these hospitals have been made financially worse off, it is at least consistent with the previous analysis that they are now reimbursed by Medicaid rather than relying on local tax support.
Looking across Table 4 , these findings remain in place across the further urban and rural political subsamples. As a further sensitivity check, we limit the sample to only hospitals that reported state/local funds prior to 2014 (Table 5 ). The coefficients are largely not statistically significant. This finding suggests that effects of local government spending were not isolated to a subset of hospitals identified as needing state/local government support prior to the expansion.
Conclusion
Do local governments represent the interests of their constituents? There are few empirical investigations despite the centrality of this question to the main argument for the existence of local government. This research provides evidence that American local governments did react in a manner that was voter-preference consistent given incentives created when states expand Medicaid under the Affordable Care Act. A difference-indifferences empirical analysis of data on general purpose local governments from 2006 to 2015 demonstrate that local governments in areas that voted for Romney reduced their entanglement with local hospitals by reducing their spending on hospital services and cutting property taxes. By contrast, local governments took advantage of the lower cost of delivering providing hospital services by raising property taxes and spending more on hospital services in areas that voted Obama.
When considering the changes in hospital finances, the results demonstrate that these spending changes closely correspond to changes in profitability, but not in changes in Medicaid patient volume or operating margins. These findings imply that local government financing has had a substantial influence on hospital financing, even as uninsured rates have declined. As future provisions of the ACA implement reductions in federal support of charity care through 2025, the role of local governments is likely to increase over time.
While generally pre-trend analysis supported the differences-in-differences approach employed, there were subsamples where improvements would be desirable. Continuing research could employ propensity score matching to improve on the pre-trends. Also, the post-ACA period so far is just two years, so future data releases could help in providing additional insights. This paper also is the first to investigate the local public economics of health care delivery. By illustrating the importance of local governments to hospital service provision, this paper establishes the existence of a sizable gap in the public and health economics literature. Consequently, there are substantial opportunities for future research in the area of local government entanglement with hospitals. 
Tables
Appendix. 1.2 Restrictions based on Hospital Type
Medicare Cost Reports have two variables which indicate the hospital type. The first indicator is based on the assigned provider number, which is constant over time. This measure may be prone to error because facilities could, in theory, change their firm type and not adjust their provider number. The most likely type of transition is that a hospital is . certified as a short-term acute-care hospital initially and then its competitors slowly exit the market, rendering the facility eligible to become a critical access hospital. To obtain a new number, the facility would have to allow its current Medicare certification to lapse for 6 months and then reapply for a new number. Given that Medicare is a valuable revenue source for hospitals, this is rarely done. The second indicator of hospital type is a field that is filled out annually by the hospital on the S-2 form. Whereas the first measure suffers from mis-identifying hospitals that change types, the second measure suffers from implausible inconsistency over time. In some cases, a hospital is marked as a short-term hospital one year, a psychiatric hospital the next year, and a short-term hospital the year after that. This inconsistency arises because the Medicare Cost Report data is check for validity of financial measures related to internal tracking within the Centers for Medicaid and Medicare Services, not necessarily data analysis. However, as the most consistent census of hospitals, this data is the standard for evaluating hospitals in the US.
Further complicating cross-validation across these two measures is the fact that hospital categories do not necessarily match. The classification based on provider numbers separately identifies hospitals as short-term acute-care, long-term care, pediatric, psychiatric, critical access, rehabilitative, or other. The second measure additionally separates out cancer hospitals, religious non-medical health care institutions, and alcohol and drug centers, but does not identify critical access hospitals.
To reconcile these differences in hospital type, we include any hospital that is identified as a short-term acute-care or a critical access hospital by the provider number or as a short-term acute-care hospital by the S-2 form. We exclude hospitals that were not identified as a short-term acute-care hospital at any point by either measure, excluding 121 hospital-year observations from 2006 to 2014. 431 hospital-years did not match to a zip code
Appendix. 1.3 Restrictions Based on Market Inclusion
As described in the Data section, markets are defined by hospital referral regions. Since addresses provided in the Medicare Cost Report Data could refer to either the site where hospital invoices are processed or the site of the hospital itself, we confirm location by scraping hospital name, address, and coordinates from the Google API database. We then use the zip code of this address to assign each hospital to a hospital referral region. All but 33 hospital-years mapped to an HRR; those that did not match were omitted.
Appendix. 1.4 Note on ownership
Ownership type is not consistently reported across years in the Medicare Cost Reports for similar reasons as hospital type. However, the reports do include measures of grants received from state and local governments. 
Appendix. 2 Pre-Trends
